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DECEMBER, 1921 No. z 
THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN 1920-1921, II1 
II. RJ;:cur,A'tION oF CoMM:i;:Rc:i;: 
1. Power of Congress 
I N a proceeding brought by the United States to restrain the construction of a dam in a stream alleged to be a "navigable 
river, or other navigable water of the United States," Economy 
Light & Power Co. v. United States2 held that "a river having 
actual navigable capacity in its natural state and capable of carry-
ing conunerce among the states is within the power of Congress 
to preserve for future transportation, even though it be not at 
present used for such commerce, and be incapable of such use 
according to present methods, either by reason of changed condi-
tions or because of artificial obstructions." Mr. Justice Pitney 
declared also that "the authority of Congress to prohibit ·added 
obstructions is not taken away by the fact that it has omitted to 
take action in previous cases." The river in question had once 
been used for navigation and was a continuous stretch of water 
from the Chicago Divide to its mouth. Such rapids and boulders 
as prevented navigation at the present time did not affect navi-
gable capacity. Therefore, the construction of a dam was 
enjoined.3 
1 For the preceding instalment reviewing cases on :Miscellaneous National 
powers, see 20 :MICH. L. R.iw. I. 
2 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 409 ( 1921). 
s The following articles deal to some extent with questions of federal 
power under the commerce clause: George Gleason Bogert, "Problems in 
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Turning from water to other liquids, we find Williams v. United 
State~ reaffirming the constitutionality of the Reed Amendment 
by which Congress forbade the transportation in interstate com-
merce of intoxicating liquor into any state whose laws prohibited 
the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating liquor for beverage 
purposes. Chief Justice White characterized as frivolous the objec-
tion that as the applicability of federal prohibition 9epends on the 
varying laws of various states the act was a violation of the con-
stitutional provision prohibiting any regulation of commerce which 
gives a preference to the ports of one state over those of another.5 
Cases in which the issue is the applicability of a federal statute 
to the situation before the court may in effect produce adjudica-
tions of the extent of federal power, even though technically the 
decision is confined' to statutory construction. This is dearly so 
when the federal law is held applicable. If the parties do not think 
it worth while to raise a constitutional objection, the possible objec-
tions may be assumed to be pretty slim ones. -Of the four cases 
involving the Sherman Law two found the alleged restraints of 
trade to be within the prohibitions of the statute. United States v. 
Lehigh Valley R. Co.6 broke up a combination between an inter-
state railroad, a coal company and a sales company whereby the 
carrier controlled the interstate- shipment through its control of 
production. The sales company was owned almost entirely by 
Aviation Law," 6 CoRN£LI, L. Q. ZJI; Walter L. Fisher, "The Packers and 
the Public," IS ILL. L. REv. so4; Stanley B. Houck, "Jurisdiction and Pro-
cedure of the Federal Trade Commission,'' IS ILL. L. Rev. 5I8; R.H. McRob-
erts, "The Growth of Federal Control Over Business Since the Establish-
ment of the Interstate Commerce Commission,'' 6 VA. L. REG. n. s. J34; Max 
Schoetz, Jr., "Federal Control of Corporations," 5 MARQm>Tl'E L. REv. rn8; 
Henry Veeder, "The Federal Trade Commission and the Packers," IS !Lr,. 
L. REv. 48s. 
4 2SS U.S.-, 4I Sup. Ct. 364 (192I). 
5 The ante-Eighteenth Amendment federal regulations of intoxicating 
liquor under the commerce clause are treated in an anonymous article entitled 
"An Examination of Wilkerson v. Rahrer," ·25 DICKINSON L. REv. I, and in 
Noel T. Dowling and F. Morse Hubbard, "Divesting an Article of Its Inter-
state Character,'' 5 MINN. L. REY. IOO, 2s3. 
6 2s4 U. S. 2ss, 4I Sup. Ct. 104 (1920). See I9 MidH. L. REv. 5S3· 
Chief Justice White and Mr. Justice Holmes concurred only because of prior 
-controlling decisions, and Justices McReynolds and Brandeis did not sit. 
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stockholders of the carrier and was entirely controlled by it, so 
that the transportation by the carrier of the products bought by 
the sales company \~as held to be within the prohibitions of the 
co1,nmodities clause of the Hepburn Act.7 In Ditple% Printing 
Press Co. v. Deering8 an interference with plaintiff's interstate 
trade was accomplished by exerting pressure on customers in New 
York to refuse to buy the products of a Michigan factory. This 
interference was held to violate the Sherman Law. There was no 
contention that the commerce involved was _not interstate, nor was 
such a contention advanced in the two cases9 in which the acts 
complained of were held not to violate the Sherman Law.10 
In two cases the validity of a stipulation limiting the liability of 
the carrier to a designated amount was held to be governed by 
1 In 6g U. PA. L. Ri;:v. 66 is a note on the interpretation of the com-
modities clause. In 19 MICH. L. fu:v. 22I is a discussion of the application 
of the commodities clause in United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, 40 
Sup. Ct. 425 (I920). 
8 254 U. S. 443, 4I Sup. Ct. I72 (I92I). See 2I CoLUM. L. Ri;:v. 258, 19 
MICH. L. Rsv. 628, and I Wis. L. fu:v. 187. The defendants' acts in this 
case were clearly violations of the Sherman Law under previous decisions, 
and the issue was whether they were within a provision of the Clayton Act 
prohibiting injunctions against designated acts of employees in the course of 
a dispute over conditions of labor. The majority held that they were not 
and granted the injunction. Justices Brandeis, Holmes and Clarke dissented. 
In the course of the majority opinion Mr. Justice Pitney observed that the 
acts of Congress "are of paramount authority, and their prohibitions must 
be given full effect, irrespective of whether the things prohibited are lawful 
or unlawful at common law or under local statutes." 
D Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 451 (1921), 
and Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct. 209 
(1921). The latter case involved the sale of a mine to a competing com-
pany; the former had to do with the effort of a manufacturer to fix resale 
prices. There were no explicit contracts restricting the resale price, but the 
trial court had charged that from the facts recited the jury might reason-
ably infer an understanding. A majority of the court thought that the facts 
recited did not warrant the charge, though they recognized that "essential 
agreement, combination or conspiracy might be implied from a course of 
dealing or other circumstances." The dissenting judges, Justices Pitney, 
Day and Clarke, regarded the charge of the trial court as less directory than 
did the majority. 
10 For discussions of a case holding that contracts with regard to organ-
ized baseball are not interstate in character and so not within the Sherman 
law, see 34 HARV. L. fu:v. 559 and 19 MICH. L. fu:v. 867. 
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federal law. Ga/,vesto1i, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Woodbitry11 involved 
the loss of a trunk checked between two Texas points on a ticket 
from Canada to Texas and return. Mr. Justice Brandeis said that 
the journey, if started in New York instead of Canada, "would 
have been interstate, although the particular stage of it on which 
the trunk was lost lay wholly within the state of Texas." The fact 
that the start and finish were in Canada rather than in the United 
States was material only to the question whether Congress had in 
fact undertaken to regulate such journeys. This question was 
answered in the affirmative.12 In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. 
Esteve Brothers Co.18 it was not contested that federal law is appli-
cable to the liability for error in a cable message sent from Spain 
to the United States. The dispute was on the issue of what the 
federal rule actually was.u 
11 254 U. S. 357, 41 Sup. Ct. n4 (1920). 
1 2 The Act of 1887 declared that it applied to any common carrier 
engaged in transportation "from any place in the United States to an adja-
cent foreign country." Mr. Justice Brandeis observed that "a carrier engaged in 
transportation by rail to an adjacent foreign country is, at least ordinarily, 
engaged in transportation also from that country to the United States," and 
declared that "the test of the application of the act is not the direction of the 
movement, but the nature of the transportation as determined by the field of 
the carrier's operation." 
The law of liability here applied was not one actually provided by Con-
gress, but the common law known to the federal courts as distinguished 
from that known to state courts and in this instance as opposed to that 
known to the Texas courts. The idea of the federal courts is that a shipper 
who has availed himself of a lower rate conditioned on limitation of liability 
to a designated value is estopped to claim that the value is more than that 
when it was open to him to pay a higher rate for an unlimited liability. In 
this case the filing of the tariffs with the Interstate Commerce Commission 
was held enough to limit the liability when the tariff so provided in case 
the excess rate was not paid, even though the ticket bought by the passen-
ger in Canada contained no notice of any limitation of liability and the pas-
senger was not notified of any such limitation when he bought his ticket or 
when he checked the trunk between the two Texas points. 
13 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 584 (1921). 
14 All the rates filed by the company were accompanied by stipulations 
limiting liability, but the limitation for repeated messages was higher than 
that for unrepeated ones. Mr. Justice Brandeis declared that "the fact that 
the alternative rate had tied to it a provision which, if tested, might be found 
to be void, is not material in a case where no effort was made to take advan-
tage of it." Here again the court regarded its ideas of common law as a 
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United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. C o.15 held the federal Safety 
Appliance Act applicable to two so-called transfer trains operated 
on a terminal railroad some four miles long. The issue was simply 
whether these trains were trains within the meaning of the statute. 
As to this, Mr. Justice Brandeis said: 
"A moving locomotive with cars attached is without the 
provision of the act only when it is not a train; as where 
the operation is that of switching, classifying and assem-
bling cars within railroad yards for the purpose of making 
up trains." 
Inasmuch as the Safety Appliance Act is held constitutionally 
applicable to all trains on tracks over which interstate trains run, 
without regard to the question whether the facilities in question 
are used for interstate commerce, it is reasonable to assume that 
Congress might, if it chose, prescribe the appliances of all cars and 
engines on such tracks.16 
part of the regulation provided by the federal statute. An interesting ques-
tion is suggested by the statement of Mr. Justice Brandeis that where "the 
general public upon paying the rate for an unrepeated message accepted sub-
stantially the risk of error involved in transmitting the message, the com-
pany could not, without granting an undue preference or advantage, extend 
different treatment to the plaintiff here." Suppose suit for the error had 
been brought in Spain, where the message was sent, and judgment for the 
full loss had been recovered. Would the company by paying the judgment 
violate the federal statute against discrimination? 
For a discussion of credit extension as an unfair practice under the 
Interstate Commerce Act, see 69 U. PA. L. Rmr. 365. 
In Union Pacific R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U. S. 317, 41 Sup. Ct. 283 (1921), 
a carrier was held liable for the full value of the goods lost, since there was 
only one published rate and the shipper therefore had no choice of rates for 
a limited liability or rates for an unlimited one. 
In New York Central & H. R.R. Co. v. York & Whitney Co., 256 U. S. 
-, 41 Sup. Ct. 509 (19:n), commission merchants wh~ were consignees of 
perishable products and who had paid all the demands of the carrier were 
held bound to pay more when the carrier discovered that it had by mistake 
charged less than the established rates. The consignees had no contracts 
with the carriers and they had already settled with the consignors on the 
basis of the charges originally made by the carrier. 
1s 254 U. S. 251, 41 Sup. Ct. IOI (1920). 
10 Lang v. New York Central R. Co., 255 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 381 (1921), 
in applying the rule that the Safety Appliance Act can be the foundation of 
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An effort to hold an initial carrier liable under the Carmack 
Amendment for loss on the line of a later carrier met with defeat 
in Bracht v. SOin Antonio & A. P.R. Co.11 because the court found 
that the contract with the initial carrier was for an intrastate ship-
ment only and that the later interstate shipment was a wholly new 
venture. There was at the outset no contemplation on the part of 
shipper or carrier that the goods would go beyond the destination 
named. The case was therefore distinguished from earlier ones 
in which the general course of business warranted the .. conclusion 
that the initial carriage on an intrastate bill of lading "was really 
but part of an interstate or foreign movement reasonably to be 
anticipated by the contracting parties-a recognized step towards 
a destination outside the state." The decision in the principal case 
was based on statutory construction, but it is plain that an effort 
by Congress to impose liability on the initial carrier under the cir-
cumstances here involved would encounter serious constitutional 
obstacles.18 
2. State Police Power and Interstate Commerce 
A provision in the state charter of an international bridge cor-
poratio_n requiring it to construct and maintain a roadway and path-
way over its bridge was sustained in International Bridge Co. v. 
liability to injured employees only when the carrier's failure to comply with 
tlie act is the proximate cause of the injury, held that the absence of a 
coupler on a car was not the proximate cause of an injury suffered by a 
brakeman who was squeezed between the top of the defective car and the 
top of a moving car on which he was sitting, even though the presence of 
a coupler on the offending car would have kept the moving car from coming 
into such close proximity to it as to permit the squeezing which caused the 
injury. Justices Clarke and Day dissented. 
17 254 U. S. 489, 41 Sup. Ct. 150 ( 1921). 
1s The power of Congress over intrastate rates is considered in Minor 
Bronough, "Federal Control of Intrastate Rates,'' 24 LAW NO'l'ES 187, and in 
notes in 6 CORNELL. L. Q. 412, 21 CoLUM. L. Rsv. 352, and 6g U. PA. L. R:r:v. 262. 
· In 69 U. PA. L. Rsv. 385 is a note on Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 
U. S. 175, 41 Sup. Ct. 93 (1920), holding that an express company is not a 
"common carrier by railroad" within the meaning of the federal Employers' 
Liability Law. Southern Pacific Co. v. Berkshire, 254 U. S. 415, 41 Sup. Ct. 
162 (1921), which passes on questions of negligence and assumption of risk 
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New York19 against the objection that it usurped the power of 
Congress over foreign commerce. The contention that Congress 
had assumed such control of the particular bridge as to exclude 
state intermeddling was also held to be unfounded. ·congress had 
passed a statute requiring its consent to a bridge across interna-
tional waters, but prior to this statute Congress had authorized this 
bridge and declared it to be a lawful post road. Mr. Justice Holmes 
observed that the mere fact that a bridge spans national boundaries 
does not deprive the state of control in the absence of congressional 
action, and that when Congress has acted there is no reaso,n for 
not leaving the situation as Congress has seemed to leave it. The 
case evidently caused the Supreme Court some difficulty, for a 
decision was reached only after a reargument, and the Chief Justice 
and Justices McKenna and McReynolds dissented.20 
Over the dissent of Justices Pitney and Clarke, St. Louis & S. 
under the Employers' Liability Law, is treated in 21 Cor.u:M. L. Riw. 38g. 
In 6g U. PA. L. REv. 270 is a consideration of Director General of Railroads 
v. Viscose Co., 254 U. S. 498, 41 Sup. Ct. 151 (1921), which holds that action 
of a carrier in cancelling the published classification and rates on artificial 
silk and including such silk among the articles that will not be accepted for 
shipment is a change in classification and so a matter of which a shipper 
cannot complain in the courts in the absence of review by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. Justices McKenna, Van Devanter, Pitney and 
McReynolds dissented. 
In IS Ir.r •. L. Riw. 284 is a consideration of Kansas City So. Ry. v. Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 252 U. S. 178, 40 Sup. Ct. 187 ( 1920), 19 MxcH. 
L. Ri;v. :26, which compelled the commission to estimate certain hypothetical 
costs which the court itself had declined to do on the ground that such esti-
mation was "wholly beyond the reach of any process of rational determina-
tion." 
Some problems of federal control of railroads are treated by Blewett 
Lee in "Consolidation of Carriers Under the Transportation Act, 1920,'' 6 
A. B. A. J OUR. 185. 
1 9 254 U. S. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. 56 (1920). See 16 Ir.i: •. L. Riw. 130. 
20 Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 252 U. S. 23, 40 
Sup. Ct. 279 (I920), 19 MICH. L. REv. 29, which allowed a state to regulate 
the price of natural gas of extra-state origin, is discussed in 27 W. VA. L. Q. 
180, 201. State regulation of the price of coal in the hands of the producers 
was held to be a regulation of interstate commerce in an Indiana case con-
sidered in 19 MICH. L. REv. 4I5. The question whether the commerce clause 
precludes a state from requiring persons selling extra-state eggs to post an 
announcement of that fact is discussed in 19 MxcH. L. REv. 739. 
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F. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission21 held invalid as an unrea-
sonable interference with interstate commerce the order of a state 
commission requiring interstate trains to make a detour of ten 
miles to stop at a city of 4,000 inhabitants. The road as originally 
cop.structed ran through the town in question, but a later cut-off 
left the town on a side line. It still enjoyed seven local trains each 
way, some of which made connection with all through interstate 
trains. This was thought sufficient for local needs in view of the 
inconvenience to through traffic that would be caused by the desired 
routing of interstate trains. 
In Western Union Telegraph Ca. v. Speight22 it was assumed 
that state law could not control the liability for delay in delivering 
interstate messages, and the question was whether a message sent 
between two points in a state over a route partly in another state 
was an interstate message. The court held that this must be tested 
by the actual transaction and that the message was interstate in 
fact. A question was raised whether the mode of transmission 
adopted was reasonable, but Mr. Justice Holmes answered that 
even if it were unreasonable as against the plaintiff any liability of 
the company, "if it existed, would not be a liability for an intra-
state message that never took place but for the unwarranted con-
duct and the resulting loss." Mr. Justice Pitney confined his con-
currence to the result. 
In the course of holding that the state court had erred in respect 
to the doctrine of assumption of risk in rights of action under the 
federal Employers' Liability Law, Mr. Justice McKenna remarked 
in Pryor v. Williams23 that the requirement of the federal act pre-
vails over any state law. There appears to have been no dispute 
that the action was properly brought under the federal act. In 
two cases proceedings under state compensation acts were annulled 
because the employee was held to have been engaged in interstate 
commerce at the time of his injury and therefore to be confined 
to his action under the federal statute. Philadelphia & Reading 
21 254 U. S. 535, 4I Sup. Ct. I92 (I92I). 
22 254 U. S. 17, 4I Sup. Ct. II (I920). See 2I CoLUM. L. ~. 270, IS 
ILL. L. ~v. 395, and 7 VA. L. ~. 225. A similar state case is considered 
in I9 MICH. L. ~. 227. 
23 254 U. S. 43, 4I Sup. Ct. 36 (I920). 
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Ry. Co. v. Di Donato24 involved a flagman employed by a railroad 
engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce. He was held 
to be engaged in interstate commerce, even though flagging an intra-
state train, since his duties were essential to the safety of all trains. 
Mr. Justice Clarke dissented. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. 
P olk2u had to do with an employee on a freight train carrying inter-
state and intrastate cars. The state court had approved of the 
award of compensation under the state act on the theory that the 
burden was on the defendant to show that the plaintiff was engaged 
in interstate commerce at the time of his injury and that there had 
:JJeen no such showing. Mr. Justice McKenna declared that the 
general duties of the employee caused him to be engaged in inter-
state as well as _intrastate commerce and that the state court was 
unwarranted in presuming, in the absence of proof, that his duties 
were in intrastate commerce. He added that "the presumption, 
indeed, might be the other way," and observed that "it is to be 
remembered that it is the declaration of the cases that if there is 
an element of interstate commerce in a traffic or employment it 
determines the remedy of the employee." Mr. Justice Clarke again 
dissented, as he is apt to do when a decision is to the effect that 
the proceeding has been started under the wrong statute.26 
One of the objections to a requirement to remove grade cross-
ings which was before the court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Board of 
Public Utility Commissioners21 was that the expense of compliance 
would interfere unwarrantably with interstate commerce, but Mr. 
Justice Holmes replied that "to engage in interstate commerce the 
railroad must get on to the land, and to get on to it must comply 
with the conditions imposed by the state for the safety of its citi-
zens." Chief Justice White and Justices Van Devanter and McRey-
nolds dissented, but whether on the commerce question or on the 
other grounds in the case does not appear. 
24 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 516 (1921) 
25 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 518 (1921). 
26 For notes on cases on the question whether an action should be brought 
under state law or under the federal Employers' Liability Law, see 9 CAI.nt. 
L. Rsv. 26o, 19 MICH. L. ~v. 2n, and 6g U. PA. L. ~v. 290, 392. 
The effect on state compensation laws of the federal Safety Appliance 
Act is discussed in 21 Cor.uM. L. ~v. 38g and 30 YAI.~ L. J. 732. 
21 254 U. S. 394. 41 Sup. Ct. 16g (1921). 
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3. State Ta%ation and Interstate Commerce 
In this review of ~onstitutional decisions for 1919-192028 it was 
said that the question whether income from interstate commerce 
may be included in the assessment of a net income tax when the 
tax is a special one on corporations only and not a state-wide income 
tax was before the Supreme Court in cases contesting the corpora-
tion income tax law of Connecticut. The question was decided in 
the affirmative in Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain29 
without adverting to the possibility of any distinction between 
taxes on all income from business within the state and taxes on 
corporate income only. The question whether such a tax may be 
imposed on a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate 
commerce was not before the court, since the foreign corporation 
in question did some local business in Connecticut. Yet the opinion 
of Mr. Justice Brandeis suggests the inference that the exemption 
enjoyed by foreign corporations engaged exclusively in interstate 
commerce with respect to state excises on doing business within 
the state, when measured by some proportion of capital stock or 
imposed as a specific charge, will not be extended to excises meas-
ured by net income. After pointing out that payment of the tax 
is not a precedent to engaging in interstate commerce and that 
"the statute is, therefore, not open to the objection that it compels 
the company to pay for the privilege of interstate commerce," Mr. 
Justice Brandeis goes on to say: 
"A tax is not obnoxious to the commerce clause merely be-
cause imposed upon property used in interstate commerce, 
even if it takes the form of a tax for the privilege of exercis-
ing its franchise within the state. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. 
v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 695. This tax is based upon the 
net profits earned within the state. That a tax measured 
by net profits is valid, although these profits may have been 
derived in part, or indeed mainly, from interstate commerce, 
is settled. U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321; 
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 57. Compare Peck & Co. v. 
Lowe, 247 U. S. 32I. Whether it be deemed a property tax 
2s 19 M1cH. L. Rsv. 34 
20 254 U. S. n3, 41 Sup. Ct. 45 (1920). 
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or a franchise tax, it is not obnoxi_ous to the commerce 
clause." 
Further indication that a tax measured by net income will be judged 
by its effect, without regard to what kind of a tax "it be deemed,'' 
appears in the discussion whether the tax violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment because imposed on income from business outside the 
state, where Mr. Justice Brandeis says that "in considering this 
objection we may lay to one side the question whether this is an 
excise tax, purporting to be measured by the income accruing from 
business within the state, or a direct tax upon that income; for 
'this argument, upon analysis, resolves itself into a mere question 
of definitions, and has no legitimate bearing upon any question 
raised under the federal Constitution.' " The phrase "any ques-
tion" must include questions under the commerce clause as well as 
those under the Fourteenth Amendment. With technical distinc-
tions as to the nature of the tax set to one side, net profits exclu-
sively from interstate <:ommerce should be subject to the same levy 
as net profits "mainly" from interstate commerce. 
Taxation of the "intangible property" of a domestic corporation 
engaged exclusively in interstate commerce was sustained in St. 
Loitis & E. St. L. Electric Ry. Co. v. Missouri3° against the objec-
tion that it was a regulation of interstate commerce. The com-
plainant was an electric railroad operating wholly on an interstate 
bridge. By the application of the unit rule its tangible property 
in Missouri was assessed for about $r3,ooo and "all other prop~ 
erty" in Missouri for $r73,ooo. This "other property" was obvi-
ously a capitalization of earning capacity. The company alleged 
that this "other property" consisted "solely of its franchise to con-
duct interstate passenger traffic over the interstate bridge," but 
Mr. Justice Clarke answered that the "large value" which the com-
pany concededly had "was derived, not from its mere franchise 
to do an interstate business, but from the exclusive right which 
we have seen the company acquired by private contract to operate 
over the Eads Bridge and from other rights also derived from pri-
vate contract" to make its lines part of Illinois systems of suburban 
electric railroads. It was assumed that the assessment board must 
30 256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 488 (1921). 
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hav.e taken these contracts into consideration and that therefore 
the claim that the tax was levied exclusively upon the franchise to 
~o an interstate business was unsound. The applic?-ble law devel-
oped in earlier decisions was stated as follows : 
"Slightly condensed, it is that, while a state may not, in 
the guise of taxation, constitutionally compel a corporation 
to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, 
yet this immunity does not prevent the state from imposing an 
ordinary property tax upon property having a situs within 
its territory and employed in interstate commerce. Even the 
franchise of a corporation, if not derived from the United 
States, although that franchise is the business of interstate 
commerce, is subject to state taxation as part of its property." 
This case was cited in St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Mid-
dlekamp,31 decided the same day, for the proposition that a fran-
chise tax on domestic corporations measured by the value of assets 
within the state is not invalidated because "the value of the fran-
chise taxed is derived partly from the fact that the corporation 
does interstate business." 
A license tax assessed at the specific sum of $6o on the local non-
federal business of a telegraph company was sustained in Postal 
Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Fremon't82 as not a regulation of interstate 
commerce, although it was conceded that for the two years in ques-
tion the company had conducted its intrastate business at a loss. 
Mr. Justice McKenna observed that the power to impose such license 
taxes on local business "of course has its limitations and must be 
exercised with due relation to the company's interstate business," 
but he pointed out that this relation "is not disposed of by the sim-
ple assertion of loss" and that "the cause of it or the condition of 
it is to be considered." He found the tax of $60 not "repellant 
from its amount" and noted that "ther~ is no pretense that its impo-
sition 'is a disguised attempt to tax interstate commerce.' " The 
fact that the company was compelled by the state to carry on intra-
state business was held not controlling where the company had failed 
to avail itself of the privilege afforded by state law of petitioning 
111 256 U. S. -, 4r Sup. Ct. 489 (r92r). 
32 255 U.S. I24, 41 Sup. Ct. 279 (1921). 
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the state railway commission for permission t.o increase its intra-
state rates. With apparent approval, Mr. Justice McKenna noted 
that the state supreme court "expressed the view that mere proof 
of loss for two years, which may have been exceptional, determined 
nothing in the absence of a showing what business was available to 
the company or what facilities it had used." Though the court has 
several times recognized a principle that a specific license fee on 
unremunerative local business or a specific fee disproportionate to 
local business may be an invalid burden on interstate business, it 
has not thus far found a case to which the principle has been deemed 
applicable.83 
That a license fee which falls indiscriminately and unescapably 
on the combined business of making domestic and interstate sales 
is wholly invalid is reaffirmed in Bowman v. Continental Oil Co.u 
This involved a fee of $50 for each place in which oil was distrib-
uted. The case arose in the f ederaf district court, so that the state 
court had had no opportunity to declare that the demand was really 
imposed only on domestic sales. In refusing to reinterpret the 
statute so as to make it constitutional, Mr. Justice Pitney said~ 
"No doubt the state might impose a license tax upon the 
distribution and sale of gasoline in domestic commerce if it 
did not make its payment a condition of carrying on inter-
state or foreign commerce. But the state has not done this 
by any act of legislation. Its executive and administrative 
officials have disavowed a purpose to exact payment of the 
license tax for the privilege of carrying on interstate com-
merce. But the difficulty is that, since plaintiff, so far as 
appears, necessarily conducts its interstate and domestic 
commerce in gasoline indiscriminately at the same stations 
and by the same agencies, the license tax cannot be enforced 
83 Cases on the question whether state inspection fees are so excessive 
as to be an invalid tax on interstate commerce are discussed in 34 HARV. L. 
Rsv. 333 and 19 MrcH. L. Rsv. 209. Taxes on the interstate transmission of 
oil and gas are considered in 27 W. VA. L. Q. 345. For articles on state taxa-
tion and interstate commerce, see Thomas Reed Powell, "Taxation of Things 
in Transit," 7 VA. L. Rsv. 167, 245, 429, 497, and Cordenio A. Severance, 
"Gross Earnings Taxes Levied by States,'' 7 A. B. A. JoUR. II3. 
84 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct 6o6 (1921). 
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at all without interfering· with interstate commerce unless 
it be enforced otherwise than as prescribed by the statute-
that is to s~y, without authority of law. Hence it cannot 
be enforced at all.'' 
The method of enforcement referred to was a prohibition against 
the conduct of any business without payment of the fee. The same 
result would doubtless have been reached had the state provided 
for collection of the license fee by suit, for the imposition would 
still have been on all business, including interstate. This case was 
the second advent before the Supreme Court of the litigation con-
sidered the year before.35 In addition to this license fee it involved 
an excise of two cents per gallon on all oil sold or used within the 
state. This tax was held divisible and invalid only as to oil sold 
in the original package in which it came from other states. Mr. 
Justice Pitney makes clear that the expression "in quantities to suit 
purchasers," used by Mr. Justice Day at the prior hearing, refers 
to sales which require the breaking of the original packages. So 
we know that if a company brings a barrel of oil into a state and 
sells half of it to one customer and half to another it is taxable on 
every gallon sold, while a sale of the whole barrel to a single cus-
tomer is exempt, unless such sale is by a peddler or an auctioneer. 
The oil may be subjected to the general property tax, though still 
in the original package in the hands of the one who brought it 
into the state. The principal case bolds also that "any and all oil 
used by the plaintiff" may ·be subjected to the excise of two cents 
per gallon. These nice distinctions between property taxes and 
sales taxes, between sales by peddlers or auctioneers and sales gen-
erally, between sales of parts of barrels and sales of whofo barrels, 
and between sale and consumption have now been established by 
explicit adjudication, but they still await those substantial practical 
justifications which the law as the embodiment of perfect reason 
must be eager for the Supreme Court to give. 
Another license. tax on sales came before the court in Bethlehem 
Motors Corporation v. Flynt.36 Here a Pennsylvania corporation 
-s5 Askren v. Continental Oil Co., 252 U. S. 444, 40 Sup. Ct. 355 (r920), 
19 MICH. L. RlW. 32. 
a6 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 571 (1921). 
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shipped automobiles to North Carolina consignees who sold them 
from their storage warehouse. We are not told whether the sales 
were in the original packages -or not. Persons selling cars within 
the state, were subject to a $500 license fee unless the manufacturer 
had paid a similar tax to the state. This fee was reduced to $100 
if the cars came from a manufacturer who invested three-fourths 
-0£ his assets in property within the state or in the bonds of the 
state or of its municipalities. This obviously made it cheaper to 
sell cars manufactured within the state than cars made outside, since 
most local factories would be owned by compa~ies having three-
fourths of their assets within the state, and few if any extra-state 
factories would be in a similar situation. This discrimination was 
held invalid under the equal-protection clause if the complainant 
was a person within the jurisdiction, and invalid under the com-
merce clause if the complainant was still without the jurisdiction. 
Obviously, the discrimination should make the tax bad under the 
-commerce clause, whether the sales were. after the original package 
had been broken or not, and whether the complainants were tech· 
nically persons within the jurisdiction or not. Mr. Justice 
McKenna's opinion on the commerce question is such a medley of 
-different ideas that the only safe way to condense it is to give it 
in full: 
"If they [the complainants] are not within the state, their 
second contention is that the act is an attempt to regulate 
interstate commen:e. If it have that effect it is illegal, for 
a tax on an agent of a foreign corporation for the sale of a 
product is a tax on the product, and if the product be that 
of another state it is a tax on commerce between the states. 
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275; Webber v. Virginia, 103 
U.S. 344; Darnell & Son v. Memphis, 2o8 U. S. n3. This 
is the assertion of plaintiffs in error; defendants in error 
interpose a denial to the assertion and the denial is supported 
by the Supreme Court [of North Carolina] on the authority 
of.,Brown v. Houston, II4 U. S. 622; Sewing Machine Co. 
v. Bricknell, 233 U. S. 304. The basis of the denial and its 
support by the ·Supreme Court is that the automobiles had 
passed out of. interstate commerce and had reached repose 
in the state, and blend [sic] with the other things of the 
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state, and because [sic] subject to interstate regulation. It 
is doubtful if that be a justifiable deduction from the find-
ings of the trial court. But comment is not necessary. It 
is the finding of the court that the automobiles were in the 
hands of the agents of the consigning corporation and there-
fore, a tax against them was practically a tax on their im-
portation into the state. It is not necessary to say it would be 
useless to send them to the state if their sale could be pre-
vented by a prohibitive tax or one so discriminating that it 
would prevent competition with the products of the state. 
This is the ruling of the cases we have cited. It is especially 
the ruling in Darnell & Son v. Memphis, supra. This im-
position of such a tax is practically the usurpation of the 
power of Congress over interstate commerce, and therefore 
illegal." 
Some of this language, it is to be noted, goes beyond discriminatory 
taxes and beyond taxes on sales of articles in the original packages 
in which they entered the state. Justices Pitney and Brandeis dis-
sent, but without opinion. 
III. TA'XA'l'ION 
I. Federal Taxes 
The federal income, excess profits, and estate taxes brought to 
the Supreme Court some fundamental constitutional questions 
'\vhich it found easy to answer in favor of the government. The 
contention that profit from the sale of corporate stock or other 
property when realized by a non-trader is capital and not in-
come under the Sixteenth Amendment was dismissed by quota-
tion of definitions from previous opinions and on the authority of 
decisions under the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, which had been 
recognized obiter as settling that such profit is income under the 
Amendment. Troublesome statements in earlier opinions that such 
a profit is capital and not income were rejected as obiter diet~ or 
as confined to the interpretation of particular statutes. The opin-
ions of Mr. Justice Clarke in the four cases37 declaring and apply-
s1 The cases are the ones cited in notes 38-41 infra. For notes on the 
Supreme Court decisions, see 34 HARV. L. ~v. 78r, 16 ILL. L. RIW. 68, 19 MICH. 
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ing this definition of income contain no analysis of the objections 
thus summarily disposed of. The court was unanimous, but the 
reporter states that '"Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis~ 
because of prior decisions of the court, concur only in the judgment." 
In Merchants~ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka88 the profit in 
question was realized by a trustee under a will which provided 
that "accretions of selling values should be considered principal 
and not income." The contention that this profit is not income to. 
the life-tenant because she does not get it, and not income to the 
remaindermen because they do not get it and may never get it, was. 
answered by saying that for the purpose of taxation it is to be, 
treated as if the trustee were the sole owner. The fact that the 
profit was realized by a single sale by a non-trader was held of no. 
importance. Cases holding that such profit realized by a trustee 
must be credited to the principal of the trust and not to income 
were said to be "of little value in determining such a question as. 
we have here." British income tax decisions were also put aside 
as "without value" because of the particular British statutes of 
which they were interpretations. No mention was made of the' 
point that the profit was treated as income for the year in which 
it was realized, although only a part of the gain accrued in that 
year. 
In Eldorado Coal & Mining Co. v. Mager89 the profit taxed as 
income was that realized by a corporation upon a disposition of its 
entire plant preparatory to winding up its business. The ·corpora-
tion was not formally dissolved during the tax year in question on 
account of unsettled liabilities for various federal taxes. 
In Goodrich v. Edwards4° and Walsh v. Brewster41 individuals 
L. R.Ev. 854, 5 MINN. L. ~v. 568, and 68 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 380. For discussions 
prior to the Supreme Court decisions, see Fred R. Fairchild and Robert M. 
Haig, "Is Increase in the Value of Capital Income?" 6 Bur.r.. NAT. TAX 
AssN. 213; Thomas Reed Powell, "Income from Sales of Investments,'' 6 
Bur.r.. NAT. TAx ASSN. 137; and notes in 21 Cm:,uM. L. R.Ev. 163, 34 HARV. 
L. ~v. 564, 15 Ir.r.. I,. R.Ev. 535, 5 MINN. L. R.Ev. 238, 6g U. PA. I,. R.Ev. 253, 
6 VA. L. RJW. n. s. 847, 868, and 30 YAI.E L. J. 3g6, 428. 
38 255 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 386 ( 1921). 
39 255 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 390 (1921). 
40 255 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 390 (1921). 
41255 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 392 (1921). 
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were held subject to the income tax on profit realized from the 
sale of corporate stock and bonds. The court held that the statute 
meant to tax no more than the actual gain on the transaction when 
the original purchase price was higher than the later value of the 
property on March l, 1913, the effective date of the Sixteenth 
Alnendment. It was clear enough that the statute meant to tax no 
more than the amount by which the sale price exceeded the value 
on March l, 1913, but the tax authorities had insisted that this 
amount was taxable as income, even though the value on that date 
was less than the original cost, thus claiming that there may be 
tax~ble income even though the entire transaction yields a loss. 
During th~ argument the solicitor general conceded that this con-
struction was erroneous and the court agreed with him, thus avoid-
ing the necessity of deciding whether the interpretation previously 
insisted upon by the internal revenue department could satisfy the 
conception of income under the Sixteenth Amendment. The Brew-
ster case held also that loss of interest on an investment could not 
be regarded as part of the original cost, even when this loss was a 
stipulated part of the purchase transaction prior to the effective 
date of the Sixteenth Amendment. Without analysis, the claim 
of the taxpayer was d~clared to be answered by a decision in a case 
under the Corporation Excise Tax of 1909.42 
4 2United States v. Woodward, 256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 615 (1921), held 
that under the Act of 1918 the amount paid to the United States as an 
estates tax may be deducted from gross income in reaching the amount to 
be assessed for the income ta..'C. The decision to the same effect in the 
Court of Claims is commented on in 30 YALE L. J. 770. 
A decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; which 
the Supreme Court declined to review on request for certiorari, held that 
under the federal income tax law of l9I3 an individual cannot deduct from 
his income the amount paid for an inheritance tax under the statute of New 
York. This point is considered in 19 MICH. L. REv. 348 and 30 YAt.E L. J. 199. 
Other questions of the interpretation of federal income tax laws are 
dealt with in 34 HARV. L. REY. 220, IS lr.L. L. REv'. 339, 342, 534. 19 MICH. L. 
REv. 103, and 7 VA. L. REY. 131, 151. Disputes as to deductions under the 
Corporation Excise of 1909 are treated in 30 YALE L. J. 636, 636 (two notes). 
Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245, 40 Sup. Ct. 550 (I920), I9 MICH. L. REv. 
II7, which held that a tax on the salary of a federal judge is a diminution 
:thereof within the constitutional prohibition against diminution, is consid-
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The constitutionality of the excess profits tax was affirmed in 
La Belle Iron Works v. United States.43 Here again the court was 
unanimous, though Mr. Justice McReynolds confined his concur-
rence to the result. The statute in question imposes a graduated 
tax on the net income from certain trades and businesses in excess 
of the deduction allowed. The deductions are reached by talcing 
certain percentages of the invested capital of the business. Income 
in excess of these percentages is subjected to a progressive tax in 
addition to the general income tax on corporations and individuals. 
Thus, the higher the invested capital the greater the deduction and 
the less the tax. The claimant before the court had, prior to 1904, 
acquired certain assets at a cost of $190,000, which by 1912 had 
become worth not less than $ro,ro5,400. This increase was due in 
part to explorations and developments, but the cost of these activi-
ties was not disclosed by the claimant, so that the appreciation was 
treated as an "unearned increment." In interpreting the statute the 
court confined the "invested capital" to the capital invested, and 
excluded appreciation since the original acquisition of the property. 
ered in 20 Cor.u:r.r. L. REv. 794, 34 HARV. L. REv. 70, 85, 5 MINN. L. REv. 145, 
7 VA. L. REv. 6g, 76, and 30 YALE L. J. 76. 
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189 (1920), 19 MICH. L. 
REv. n8, which held stock dividends not income under the Sixteenth Amend-
ment, is discussed in Eustace Seligman, "Implications and Effects of the 
Stock Dividend Decision," 21 Cor.u:i.r.-L. REv. 313; and a note in 7 VA. L. 
REv. 134-
For other discussion of federal income taxation, see Arthur A. Ballan-
tine, "Corporate Personality in Income Taxation," 34 HARV. L. REv. 573; 
Raymond G. Brown, "The Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution,'' 54 A:r.r. L. REv. 843; Harry Hubbard, "From Whatever Source 
Derived," 6 A. B. A. J OUR. 203 ; A. E. James, "Tax Exemptions in the 
Income Tax," 6 Bur.r.. NAT. TAX ASSN. 238; George E. Putnam, "Income 
Tax Exemption," 6 Bur.r.. NAT. TAX AssN. 75; William S. Rea, "Exemption 
of State and Municipal Bonds from Federal Income Tax," 25 LAW NoTI!S 5; 
and Hugh Satterlee, "Simplification of Federal Taxation," 6 Bur.L. NAT. 
TAX ASSN. 72. 
43 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 528 (1921). For discussions of the issue 
prior to the Supreme Court decisions, see Arthur A. Ballantine, "Some Con-
stitutional Aspects of the Excess Profits Tax," 29 YALE L. J. 625, and Charles 
McCamic, "Appreciation in Value as Invested Capital Under the Excess 
Profits Law," 30 YALE L. J. 239. 
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This taking of original cost instead of present value was alleged by 
the taxpayer to have "the effect of rendering the act 'glaringly 
unequal and of doubtful constitutionality; the insistence being that, 
so construed, it operates to produce baseless and arbitrary discrim-
inations, to the extent of rendering the tax invalid under the due-
process clause of the Fifth Amendment." In meeting this objection 
Mr. Justice Pitney made no mention of the position taken by Chief 
Justice White in earlier cases that the Fifth Amendment does not 
limit the federal taxing power. He put aside certain decisions 
under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
clearly not in point, because "the Fifth Amendment has no equal 
J>rotection clause," and reiterated the established ruling that the 
only requirement of uniformity in federal indirect taxes is of geo-
graphical uniformity against which the excess profits tax concededly 
co~its no offense. He prefaced his consideration of the alleged 
unreasonable discriminations by saying: 
"Nor can we regard the act-in basing 'invested capital' 
upon actual costs to the exclusion of higher estimated values 
-as productive of arbitrary discriminations raising a doubt 
about its unconstitutionality under the due-process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. The difficulty of adjusting any sys-
tem of taxation so as to render it precisely equal in its bear-
ing is proverbial, and such nicety is not even required of the 
states under the equal-protection clause, much less of Con-
gress under the more general requirement of due process of 
law in taxation. Of course it will be understood that Con-
gress has very ample authority to adjust its income taxes 
according to its discretion, within the bounds of geograph-
ical uniformity. Courts have no authority to pass upon the 
propriety of its measures; and we deal with the present crit-
icism only for the purpose of refuting the contention, 
strongly urged, that the tax is so wholly arbitrary as to 
amount to confiscation." 
This seems to make confiscation rather than arbitrary discrimina~ 
tion the only possible offense under the Fifth Amendment, thus 
attaching importance to discrimination only as the more favorable 
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position of competitors may result in confiscation of the property 
or business of the less privileged. Mr. Justice_ Pitney, however, 
does not make this explicit nor does he give any elucidation of 
what the court means by "confiscation." He goes on to say that 
"the act treats all corporations and partnerships alike, so far as 
they are similarly circumstanced," and that if the valuation of cap4 
ital "according to what actually was embarked at the outset or 
added thereafter, disregarding any appreciation in values," makes 
the tax in particular instances "seem to bear upon one corporation 
more than upon another, this is due to difference in their circum4 
stances, not to any uncertainty or want of generality in the tests 
applied." The reasonableness of taking cost as a basis is predi4 
cated on its superior certainty and on the "logical incongruity" of 
taking estimates of values which could be realized only by a sale 
that would require the abandonment of the purpose for which the 
property is held. Reference is made to the customary practice of 
issuing different classes of securities, bonds, preferred stock and 
common stock, for different kinds of contribution to corporate cap4 
ital, and it is concluded that "upon like grounds it was not unrea· 
sonable for Congress, in adjusting the 'excess profits tax,' to accord 
preferential treatment to capital representing actual investments, 
as compared with capital representing higher valuations based upon 
estimates, however confident and reliable, of what probably could 
be realized were the property sold instead of retained." 
The federal estates tax was unanimously sustained in New York 
Trust Co. v. Eisner44 against the objections that it is unequal, that 
it is a direct tax not apportioned as the Constitution requires, and 
that it is an unconstitutional interference with the right of the 
states to regulate descent and distribution. The third objection 
will be dealt with in a later section on intergovernmental relations, 
The contention that the tax is direct was based upon the fact that, 
being on the estate, it is inevitable, and not, like a legacy tax on 
the privilege of receiving, avoidable and so indirect. "That mat· 
ter,'' answered Mr. Justice Holmes, was disposed of by the case 
sustaining a federal legacy tax, "not by an attempt to make some 
44 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 5o6 (1921). 
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scientific distinction, which would be at least difficult, but on an 
interpretation of language by its traditional use-on the practical 
and historical ground that this kind of a tax always has been 
_ regarded as the antithesis of a direct tax; 'has ever been treated 
as a duty or excise, because of the particular occasion which gives 
rise to its levy.' " "Upon this point," he adds, "a page of history 
is worth a volume of logic." He disposes of the complaint of 
inequality by saying: 
"The inequalities charged upon the statute, if there is an 
intestacy, are all inequalities in the amounts~ that benefi-
ciaries might receive in cases of estates of different values, 
of different proportions between real and personal estate, 
and of different numbers of recipients; or if there is a will 
affecting legatees. As to the inequalities in case of a will, 
they must be taken to be contemplated by the testator. . He 
knows the law and the consequences of the dispositions that 
he makes. As to intestate successors, the tax is not imposed 
upon them but precedes them, and the fact that they may 
receive less or different sums because of the statute does not 
concern the United States.'' 
The objections thus dismissed were doubtless based upon the fact 
that the federal tax reduces the estate as a whole instead of taking 
from each beneficiary according to the amount coming to him from 
the deceased. In construing the act the court allowed no deduction 
of state inheritance and succession taxes. The reason appeared to 
be that all the state taxes in question were "taxes on the right of 
individual beneficiaries" and "not charges that affect the estate as 
a whole," and hence not "charges against the estate" in the words 
of the federal act. It is not intimated that this construction was 
objected to on constitutional grounds. The reasoning leaves open 
the possibility of a different attitude toward the deduction of state 
taxes on the estate as a whole. \i\l'hat amount the state may take 
as a basis of taxation, and questions of priority between the United 
States and the state were said not to be open in the particular case.45 
45 Certain aspects of the application of the federal estates tax to the 
American assets of foreigners are treated in Julius Goebel, Jr., "The Return 
on Estates of Non-resident Decedents," 7 VA. L. Riw. 343. 
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In United States v. Field-Ia the Act of 1916 was interpreted not 
to include in the estates tax property passing under a testamentary 
execution of a general power of appointment created prior to the 
enactment of the statute. That a later statute specifically including 
such an e..'Cecution will be sustained as constitutional is likely from 
Mr. Justice Pitney's citations in the principal case following his 
statement that no question is "suggested as to the power of Con-
gress to impose a tax upon the passing of property under testament-
ary execution of a power of appointment created before, but exe-
cuted after, the passage of the taxing act."47 
A concededly drastic method of preventing or penalizing the eva-
sion of federal tax laws was sustained in Goldsmith--Grant Co. v. 
United States.48 An Act of 1866 provided for the forfeiture of 
any conveyance used in transporting commodities removed with 
intent to evade a tax thereon. Under this provision the govern-
ment seized an automobile in which untaxed liquor was trans-
ported. Title to the car was in a conditional vendor who was 
entirely innocent of any complicity in its unlawful excursion. He 
contended that the statute ought not to be construed to command 
a forfeiture of his interest, and that if so construed it denied due 
process of law. The court reserved opinion as to· whether the 
statute could be extended to property stolen from the owner or 
otherwise taken from him without his privity or consent, and put 
to one side as a danger not yet realized the possibility that it might 
forfeit a Pullman car or an ocean steamship. Mr. Justice McKenna 
conceded that there is strength to the contention that the forfeiture 
of the interest of any innocent owner "seems to violate that justice 
which should be the foundation of the due process of law required 
by the Constitution," but against it he found "other and militating 
considerations." The important one seemed to be the necessity of 
adequate provision against evasion of the revenue laws. With 
re~pect to certain kinds of property that are facilities for such eva-
4a 255 U. S. 257, 41 Sup. Ct. 256 (1921). 
47 Another problem in interpreting the federal estates tax law is dealt 
with in 5 MINN. L. Rm. 78. 
48254 U.S. 505, 41 Sup. Ct._189 (1921). See 15 ILL. L. Ri;v. 6I3 and 69 
U. PA. L. Ri;v. 189. A somewhat similar issue is treated in 5 MINN. L. Ri;v. 
482. 
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sion "Congress interposes the care and responsiblity of their own-
ers in aid of the prohibitions of the law and its punitive provisions, 
by ascribing to the property a certain personality, a power of 
complicity and guilt in the wrong." The analogy of the deodand 
is referred to and Blackstone is quoted for the practical justifica-
tion "that such misfortunes are in part owing to the negligence of 
their owner, and therefore he is properly punishable by such for-
feiture." Sir William's references to Moses and to the Athenians 
are also quoted, and it is concluded that whether the reason for the 
forfeiture "be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive 
and remedial jurispruden,ce of the country to be now displaced." 
Old ways did not make so strong an appeal to Mr. Justice McRey-
nolds and he therefore dissented.49 
In Minnesota v. Martinson50 a defendant who had violated a state 
police regulation of the sale of habit-forming drugs contended that 
the state law was void for interference with the collection of the 
federal tax on dispensers of such drugs, but the court was unable 
to find the interference alleged. 
The chief complaint urged against the Connecticut excise on 
49 In holding that under the applicable federal statutes failure to appeal 
to the commissioner of internal revenue after payment of a tax precluded 
suit for a refund against the government, even though an application for 
abatement was made to the commissioner before payment, Mr. Justice Holmes 
remarked in Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 141, 41 
Sup. Ct. 55 (1920): 
"Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Govern-
ment. If it attaches even purely formal conditions to its consent to 
be sued, those conditions must be complied with. Lez non praecipit 
inutilia (Co. Lit. l27b) expresses rather an ideal than an accomplished 
fact. But in this case we cannot pronounce the second appeal a mere 
form. On appeal a judge sometimes concurs in a reversal of his 
decision below. It is possible, as suggested by the Court of Claims, 
that the second appeal may be heard by a different person. At all 
events, the words are there in the statute and the regulations, and the 
Court is of opinion that they mark the condition of the claimant's 
right." 
An effort to secure repayment of a legacy tax under the Act of l8g8 
failed in Cochran v. United States, 254 U. S. 387, 41 Sup. Ct. 166 (1921); 
one to get back an excise tax on chewing gum, in United States v. American 
Chicle Co., 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 548 (1921). 
00 256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 425 (1921). 
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corporations in Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chaniberlain51 was 
that the state had adopted an improper ratio for determining how 
much of the total income of a Delaware corporation was derived 
from Connecticut sources. Connecticut allocated to itself so much 
of the total income of manufacturing corporations as their tangible 
property in Connecticut bears to their tangible property everywhere. 
Under this rule 47 per cent of the _total income of the Undenvood 
Company was taken as the measure of the Connecticut tax, although 
of its total net receipts $r,293,643.95 was received in other states 
and only $42,942.18 in Connecticut. Of this situation Mr. Justice 
Brandeis said: 
"But this showing wholly fails to sustain the objection. 
The profits of the corporation were largely earned by a series 
of transactions beginning with manufacture in Connecticut 
and ending with sale in other states. In this it was typical 
of a large part of the manufacturing business conducted 
within the state. The legislature, in attempting to put upon 
this business its fair share of the burden of taxation, was 
faced with the impossibility of allocating specifically the 
profits earned by the processes conducted within its borders. 
It therefore adopted a method of apportionment which, for 
all that appears in this record, reached, and was meant to 
reach, only the profits earned within the state. 'The plain-
tiff's argument on this branch of the case,' as stated by the 
Supreme Court of Errors, 'carries the burden of showing 
that 47 per cent of its net income is not reasonably attrib-
utable, for purposes of taxation, to the manufacture of prod-
ucts from the sale of which 80 per cent of its gross earnings 
were derived after paying manufacturing costs.' The cor-
poration has not even attempted to show this; and for aught 
that appears the percentage of net profits earned in Connec-
ticut may have been much larger than 47 per cent. There is, 
consequently, nothing in this record to show that the method 
of apportionment adopted by the state was inherently arbi-
51 254 U.S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 45 (1920). See Harold S. Lyon, "Allocation 
of Net Income from Interstate Business," 6 BULI.. NAT. TAX AssN. 172; and 
comments in 30 YALl~ L. J. 512, 534- The decision of the court below is dis-
cussed in 20 CoLUM. L. ~v. 324 and 33 HARv. L. ~v. 736. 
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trary, or that its application to this corporation produced an 
unreasonable result." 
This is to say merely that the complainant has not proven its case. , 
Mr. Justice Brandeis adds that there is "no occasion to consider 
whether the rule prescribed, if applied under different conditions, 
might be obnoxious to the Constitution." It is worthy of note 
that the Undenvood people's objection that the tax was in reality 
in considerable measure on extra-state income is referred by the 
Supreme Court to the Fourteenth Amendment alone and not to a 
combination of the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce 
clause, as in most if not all of the prior cases dealing with corpo~ 
rate excises measured by property outside the taxing state. Previ-
ous opinions have left it doubtful whether a due-pro·c~ss objection 
alone would be sufficient to annul excises on foreign corporations 
measured in ways that include extra-territorial values. In the 
Underwood case there is no indication that any help from the com-
merce clause is needed to invalidate corporate excises found to be 
in substance taxes on property or income without the state. More-
over, in the opinion sustaining the federal excess profits tax.52 , Mr. 
Justice Pitney refers to due process alone the cases which have 
found corporate excises guilty of the vice of extra-territoriality 
when he says : 
"Appellant cites Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178, 188, 
and International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135, 
145, but these cases also are inapplicable, being based upon 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with 
which state taxing laws were held in conflict because they 
had the effect of imposing taxes on the property of foreign 
corporations located and used beyond the jurisdiction of the , 
taxing state." 
This makes it certain that Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York,53 
though not yet explicitly overruled, is no_ longer law.54 
0 2 La Belle Iron Works v. United States, note 43, sztpra. 
53 143 U. S. 305, 12 Sup. Ct. 403 (1892). 
54 Questions of jurisdiction or of matters somewhat related thereto are 
considered in Walter Clark, "Can Shares of Stock be Exempted from Tax-
ation in the Hands of Shareholders?" 54 AM. L. ~v 6Sg; Edward L. Leahy, 
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A transfer tax on transfers in contemplation of death was sus-
tained in Nickel v. Col~5 against the complaint that it violated t4e 
Fourteenth Amendment because of retroactivity. A Nevada statute 
was passed on March 26, 1913, to go into effect thirty days later. 
Before the thirty days were up a California resident transferred 
to trustees stock in a Nevada corporation which owned a California 
corporation which owned Nevada land. It was conceded that the 
transfer would be constitutionally taxable if the statute had been 
in operation at the time it was made, but it was insisted that the 
interest of the remaindermen after the death of the life tenant and 
creator of the trust had vested upon the execution of. the deed prior 
to the effective date of the statute. The Supreme Court a~swered 
that a statute passed before the date- of the deed might have been 
so drawn as to tax the deed and that a construction by the state 
court that it did in fact do so would have been good as against any 
objection under the federal Constitution. Even if the state court 
in reaching this construction went on the untenable ground that the 
deed and a contemporaneous will formed parts of a single trans-
action under which no vested right arose until the death of the 
grantor and testator, this was wholly a question of state law which 
"Rule of Apportionment of Corporate Property Upheld," 6 BUI.L. NAT. TAX 
ASSN. 39; Thomas Reed Powell, "Taxation of Things in Transit,'' 7 VA. L. 
R.Ev. 167, 245, 429, 497; notes in 21 CoLUM. L. REv. 362 and 30 YAU L. J. 529 
on when a foreign corporation is doing business within the state; in 34 
HARV. L. Ri;v. 95 on a tax at the domicile on a resident's seat in a foreign 
stock exchange; and in 34 HARV. L. REv. 542, 564, on a personal tax on a 
non-resident temporarily present within the taxing jurisdiction. 
For consideration of problems of state income taxation, see Robert 
Whitehead, "The Income Tax Laws of Virginia,'' 6 VA. L: REG. n. s. 721; 
and notes in 21 CoLUM. L. REv. 294 and I W1s. L. REv. 192 on whether cer-
tain receipts of insurance companies are income. 
The Illinois capital stock tax is discussed in 15 ILL. L. REv. 455; the 
question whether power has been delegated to a municipality to impose a 
license tax on attorneys, in 5 MINN. L. REv. 548; other questions of state 
taxation, in Thomas K. Skinker, "Constitutional Limitations on Municipal 
Taxation in Missouri," 6 ST. Loms L. REv. 6I; and E. J. Verlie, "Property 
Tax Exemption in Illinois,'' 3 Ir.L. L. B. 142. 
In Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 255 U. S. 288, 41 Sup. Ct. 272 
(1921) what purported to be an excise tax on removing liquor from bond 
was declared to be in effect a property tax and void as such under the 
Kentucky Constitution. The point is treated in a note in 35 HARV. L. Rr:v. 70. 
Gs 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 467 (1921). 
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the Supreme Court will accept, whether right or wrong, since there 
can be no pretense that the state court adopted its view to evade 
an issue under the federal Constitution. "When, as here,'' con-
cluded Mr. Justice Holmes, "the statute unquestionably might have 
made the tax applicable to this transfer, we do not inquire very 
curiously into the reasoning by !vhich the statute is held to justify 
the tax."56 
Complaints that the procedure for assessing taxes did not include 
the hearing requisite to due process were dealt with in two cases. 
In Turner v. W ade51 the procedure was held inadequate. The only 
hearing offered the taxpayer was one before arbitrators after the 
assessors had notified him of an increase of the valuation returned 
by him. Unless a majority of "the arbitrators agreed upon a decision 
within ten days after being named, the valuation of the assessors 
was to stand. In the case at bar the three arbitrators all agreed 
that the assessors had placed too high a valuation on the property, 
but each arbitrator insisted on a different valuation, and so, for 
want of a majority agreement, the valuation of the assessors stood. 
In the principal case, therefore, such hearing as the taxpayer had 
was not before the •body that fixed the assessment. The case was 
disposed of on the understanding that the state conceded "that the 
provision for arbitration, under the facts herein shown, does not 
of itself afford due process of law" and that the issue was whether 
the law provided for an adequate hearing before the board of 
assessors. The Supreme Court found that the state court had con-
strued the statute so as to provide for no hearing before this board, 
and concluded that "in the present case, as the facts stated show, 
. the ta.Xpayer is subject to an assessment made without notice and 
hearing," and so is denied due process of law. 
An opposite result was reached in St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 
Co. v. Middlekamp,58 in which the tax might be collected only by 
suit in which it was assumed that all questions of law apparent on 
56 Inheritance tax problems are considered in Joseph H. Matthews, "Pro-
posed Flat Rate upon the Transfer at Death of Personal Property of Non-
residents," 6 Bur.L. NAT. TA..'<: AssN. r32; and a note in 34 HARV. L. ~. 
44r on whether the federal inheritance tax may be deducted before assessing 
the state inheritance tax. 
51 254 U. S. 64, 4r Sup. Ct. 27 (r920). See 21 Cor.u:M. L. ~v. 284. 
58 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 48g (1921). 
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the face of the record would be open and that the only questions 
which the particular contestant would raise could be urged by it. 
The decision appears to be ·based on the conclusion that the statute 
allowed the court to consider any matter in which the particular 
complainant in this particular instance was interested and to invite 
the inference that this is sufficient even though the statute might 
withhold the requisite hearing in other controversies than the one 
under adjudication. All that Mr. Justice Holmes has to say on this 
branch of the case is as follows: 
"The objection most insisted upon in this court was that 
the statute made no provision for a hearing, and that 
although the plaintiff applied to the Tax Commission for a 
hearing and had one, the statute was bad because it did not 
provide one in terms. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 
207 U. S. 127, 138. The mode of collecting the tax is by 
a suit where, of course, the present plaintiff would be heard, 
but it is said that the judgment of the Commission can be 
attacked only for want of jurisdiction and fraud. We can-
not suppose, however, that any question of law apparent on 
the face of the record would not be open. The constitu-
tional objection mainly relied upon necessarily would be. 
And as in this case the commission acepted the plaintiff's 
figures, and the contest is wholly upon matters of law, we 
see nothing of which the plaintiff can complain in this respect. 
There is, to be sure, one charge involving matters of fact 
dehors the record. It is alleged that the plaintiff was taxed 
disproportionately as compared with other railroads. But 
the plaintiff was taxed upon its own figures in accordance 
with the statute and could not complain of that. If it had 
made out a case of fraud against the Commission we pre-
sume that the state courts would have been open to it, as 
well as the District Court of the United States. But nothing 
of that kind was proved. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wake-
field, 247 U. S. 350, 353." 
The Middlekanip case hinted also at a contention that the domes-
tic corporation before the court was denied the equal protection of 
the laws because its tax was based on its Missouri assets, while 
certain foreign corporations with stock having no stated par value 
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were admitted to the state and subjected only to a tax of $25 
imposed upon foreign corporations without capital stock; but the 
<:ontention was not considered because the court was not convinced 
that these corporations with no-par stock in fact enjoyed the sup-
posed more favorable treatment. So also, in Underwood Type-
writer Co. v. Chaniberlain,69 some unspecified contention based on 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the fact that the foreign corpora-
tion objecting to the corporation income tax had made large per-
manent- investments in the state before the law was enacted was 
said to be clearly unsound. That the objection was to some sup-
posed discrimination is to be inferred from the statement in the 
opinion that "to the facts presented here the principle discussed in 
Soitthern Railway Co. v. Greene, 2r6 U. S. 400, 414, has no appli~ 
cation." 
In five cases complaints against discrimination were squarely 
raised, and in all but one the differences of treatment were held 
proper. "fVatson v. New Y ork60 sustained the provision in the New 
York inheritance tax imposing an additional five per cent on the 
transfer of investments on which the decedent had during the des-
ignated period preceding his death paid neither the general prop-
erty tax nor the optional stamp tax. The complainant conceded 
that classification is reasonable if based on the kind or amount of 
value of the property transferred or on the relationship or the char-
acter of the transferees; but this list, said Mr. Justice Brandeis, 
"does not exhaust the possibilities of legal classification." It is 
enough that the classification "has a reasonable relation -to some 
permitted end of governmental action." The justification for the 
particular classification is put in the rhetorical query= "And what 
classification could be more reasonable than to distinguish, in 
imposing an inheritance or transfer tax, between property which 
had during the decedent's life borne its fair share of the tax burden 
and that which had not?" The court found it unnecessary to con-
sider whether the tax would have violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a property tax or as a penalty, for it held it not the former, 
alt~ough it might induce owners of investments to present them 
li9 Note 51, siepra. 
ao 254 U. S. 122, 41 Sup. Ct. 43 ( 1g.w). A state decision on the same 
question is treated in 20 CoLuM. L. REv. 625. 
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for taxation, and not the latter, although it might take a heavier 
toll than would the taxation to which the owner might have sub-
j ected himself in his lifetime. 
The discn-mination involved in the Alaska license tax on per-
sons manufacturing fish oil, fertilizer and fish meal in whole or in 
part from herring, which was sustained in Alaska Fish Salting & 
By-Products Co. v. Smith,61 was produced by the immunity enjoyed 
by persons using other fish for the same purposes and by persons 
using herring for other purposes. Though the objection was nec-
essarily founded on the Fifth rather than on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the former contains no equal-protection clause, the basis 
of the decision was that the discrimination was reasonable and the 
case, it is to be assumed, may be taken as a precedent for the inter-
pretation of the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In support of the result Mr. Justice Holmes said: 
"If Alaska deems it for its welfare to discourage the 
destruction of herring for manure and to preserve them for 
food for man or for salmon, and to that end imposes a 
greater tax upon that part of the plaintiff's industry than 
upon similar use of other fish or of the offal of salmon, it 
hardly can be said to be contravening a Constitution that has 
known protective tariffs for a hundred years. * * * Even if 
the tax should destroy a business it would not be made 
invalid or require compensation upon that ground alone. 
Those who enter upon a business. take 'that risk. * * * We 
need not consider whether abuses of the power might go to 
such a point as to transcend it, for we have not such a case 
before us. The Acts must be judged by their contents, not 
by the allegations as to their purposes in the complaint. We 
know of no objection to exacting a discouraging rate as the 
alternative to giving up a business when the legislature has 
the full power of taxation. The case is different from those 
where the power to tax is limited to inspection fees and the 
like." 
The excise on the sale and use of oil, which was sustained in 
61255 U. S. 44, 41 Sup. Ct. 219 (1921). 
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Bowman v. Continental Oil Co.62 as applied to oil no longer in the 
original package in which it entered from other states, was unsuc-
cessfully attacked as a denial of due process and of equal protec-
tion of the laws. Without stating the objection, Mr. Justice Pitney 
declared it to be without substance. The complaint was doubtless 
the same as that urged under the clause of the state constitution 
requiring that taxes shall be equal and uniform upon subjects of 
taxation of the same class. As to this Mr. Justice Pitney said: 
"We see no reason to doubt the power of the state to select 
this commodity, as distinguished from others, in order to 
impose an excise tax upon its sale and use; and since the 
tax operates impartially upon all, and with territorial uni-
formity throughout the state, we deem it 'equal and uniform 
upon subjects of taxation of the same class' within the mean-
ing of Section I of Article 8." 
The equal-protection clause was also unsuccessfully invoked in 
Dane v. Jackson63 against the provisions of the Massachusetts income 
tax, under which certain towns received back from the state con-
siderably less than the tax collected from their residents. Mr. 
Dane thought that he was discriminated against by making con-
tributions to the support of towns remote from home while persons 
in other towns not only found the bread which they cast upon the 
waters returned to their own bailiwick but also benefited from some 
of the bread that he had cast. In reply Mr. Justice Clarke told 
him how hard it is to have an exactly equal or proportional system 
of taxation and assured him that Massachusetts had stopped short 
of that arbitrariness which is necessary to make a tax offend against 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The present scheme was devised in 
part to overcome the advantages which wealthy persons derived 
from "colonization" in towns with low tax rates, and this was 
thought to be a legitimate end of legislative endeavor. A due-
process objection was held as futile as that based on the equal-
protection clause. 
In one case objection to discrimination was held to be well 
62 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 6o6 (1921). 
63 256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 566 (1921). 
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founded. This was Bethlehem Motors Corporation v. Flynt,6"' 
-- already considered in the section on regulations of inter~tate com-
merce. Here was a fee of $500 for selling automobiles within the 
state which was reduced to $rno if the manufacturer invested three-
fourths of his assets in the bonds of the state or of its counties or 
cities or in property within the state. The Supreme Court saw 
readily enough that all extra-state manufacturers or their agents 
would be liable for the $500 fee while most local manufacturers or 
their agents would pay only $rno. This was held to be a denial of 
equal protection of the laws. The question was whether the com-
plainants were "persons within the jurisdiction" so as to come 
within the scope of the equal-protection clause. The test laid down 
to determine \vhen foreign corporations become persons within the 
jurisdiction is as follows: 
" ( l) If the Pennsylvania corporation and the Indiana cor-
poration and the Delaware corporation are doing business 
in the state, and therefore within its jurisdiction, they 
undoubtedly can complain of a discrimination against them 
that is offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment. Southern 
Railway Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400. (2) If,- however, 
they are not in the state and subject to its jurisdiction, and 
seek to enter, the tax may be considered a condition which 
the state may impose. Paul v. Virginia, 8"Wall. 168, and a 
number of subsequent cases, including Southern Railway Co. 
v. Greene, sttpra. * * * 
"This court has decided too often to need citation of the 
cases that corporations doing business in a state and having 
an agent there are within the jurisdiction of the state for 
the purpose of suit against them, and we may assume that 
the principle is applicable here and that the Pennsylvania 
corporation, the Indiana corporation and the Delaware cor-
poration are within the jurisdiction of the state and subject 
to its laws, equally with the corporations of the state." 
This makes the test of being within the jurisdiction for service of 
process the test of being within the jurisdiction so as to claim the 
equal protection of the laws. It omits all mention of formal admis-
64 256 U. S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 571 (1921). 
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sion to do business and of the acquisition of a large amount of prop-
erty of a l?ermanent character-two elements present in the Greene 
case and emphasized as important in making the foreign corpora-
tion there involved a person .within the jurisdiction. For all that 
appears in Mr. Justice McKenna's opinion in the principal case, a 
foreign corporation which actually does business through agents in 
a state in violation of valid state laws nevertheless becomes a per-
son within the jurisdiction so as to be entitled to equal protection 
of the laws. The statement of facts shows that the consignees 
within the state were agents of the extra-state manufacturers for 
the purpose of selling and delivering their cars, but there is no evi-
dence that the manufacturing corporation had been formally 
admitted to do business in the state or had complied with any state 
laws applying to foreign corporations. Under this state of facts 
Mr. Justice McKenna seems to lay down a rule which puts it in 
the power of any foreign corporation to become a person within the 
jurisdiction by merely sneaking in through agents, provided they 
do enough business to make the corporation subject to service of 
J.>rocess. This ruling, however, was not necessary to the disposi-
tion of the case, since it held that if the corporation was not within 
the jurisdiction the tax is invalid under the commerce clause. 
Though the opinion says that "we may assume" that the foreign 
corporations were within the jurisdiction, there are other expres-
sions which support an inference that the court did not mean to 
decide the specific point, but was content to hold the tax bad for 
violation either of the equal-protection clause or of the commerce 
clause, without specifying which. Justices Pitney and Brandeis dis-
sented without stating their objections.65 
Three cases had to do with special assessments. In two the com-
plaints of the taxpayers were held to be unfounded. In Miller & 
Lux, Inc. v. Sacraniento & San Joaquin Drainage District66 a land 
owner assessed five cents per acre for general preliminary expenses 
for a drainage improvement found fault because the statute gave it 
65 In 20 CoLUM. L. REY. 793 is a discussion of F. S. Royster Guano Co. 
v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 40 Sup. Ct. 560 (1920), 19 MICH. L. Rsv. 126, 
· which held it a denial of equal protection to tax some domestic corporations 
on extra-state income while that of others went free. 
66 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 404 (1921). 
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no opportunity to show that its lands would receive no special or 
direct benefit from the proposed improvement, but the court deemed 
the complaint so unsubstantial as to require dismissal of the writ 
of error for want of jurisdiction. In support of this action Mr. 
Justice McReynolds observed: 
"Since Houck v. Little River Drainage District, (1915), 
239 U. S. 254, the doctrine has been definitely settled that 
in the absence of flagrant abuse or purely arbitrary action a 
state may establish drainage districts and tax lands therein 
for local improvements, and that none of such lands may 
escape liability solely 'because they will not receive direct 
benefits. The allegations of the original complaint are 
wholly insufficient to raise the issue in respect of arbitrary 
legislative action presented by Myles Salt Co. v. Board of 
Commissioners, 239 U. S. 478."67 
The unsuccessful resistant in Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Co. v. Mackey68 
was a railroad assessed for a street improvement. It claimed 
immunity on the grounds that it was a federal instrumentality for 
developing Indian coal lands, that the assessment did not sufficiently 
identify its property, that the statute did not authorize the assess-
ment, that it was not benefited thereby, and .that the assessment 
could be collected only by sale of its property, which would sever 
an integral part and render it incapable of performing its public 
duties. No complaint was made of the amount of the assessment 
in case of liability. Mr. Justice Brandeis answered that if the 
validity of the assessment was established it might be assumed that 
due payment would follow, that the fact that the road served the 
federal government did not render· it immune from state taxation, 
that it was not harmed by any insufficiency in the description of its 
land which could in no case entitle it to more than a re-assessment, 
that it was in effect the absolute owner of its road and stations, 
and that the betterment was of a nature to enhance the value of its 
use of its facilities, since street paving is a class of betterment to 
67 A question of whether adequate notice was given in levying a special 
assessment for the repair of drains is considered in 5 MINN. L. REY. 555. 
68 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 582 (1921). 
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which the railroad right of way and sta.tions is generally held to be 
subject. 
In Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Road Improvemerit District 
No. 669 an assessment on a railroad for a road improvement was set 
aside because of the whimsical way in which the alleged benefits 
were apportioned. Farm lands and town lots were assessed with-
out regard to improvements or to value or to present or prospective 
use, while the complaining railroad had to pay $7,000 per mile, with 
the result that it was supposed to be benefited $67,900 for the con-
struction of r I.2 miles of gravel highway. Such an assumption, 
remarked Mr. Justice McReynolds, "seems wholly improbable, if 
not impossible," and the assessment was therefore annulled as 
wholly arbitrary. The statute had set no definite standard for 
apportioning benefits and the commissioners had not followed con-
sistently any standard of area or location or value. The general 
principles applicable to special assessments were set forth by Mr. 
Justice McReynolds as follows : 
"The settled general rule is that a state legislature 'may 
create taxing districts to meet the expenses of local improve-
ments and may fix the basis of taxation without encountering 
the Fourteenth Amendment, unless its action is palpably 
arbitrary or a plain abuse.' * *- * Ordinarily, the levy may 
be upon lands specially benefited according to value, posi-
tion, area, or the foot-front rule. * * * If, however, the statute 
providing for the tax is 'of such a character that there is no 
reasonable presumption that substantial justice generally will 
be done, but the probability is that the parties will be taxed 
disproportionately to each other and to the benefit conferred, 
the law cannot stand against the complaint of one so taxed 
in fact.' " 70 
A combination of taxation and police power was involved in 
Nicchia:. v. New Y ork,71 which sustained a statute requiring dogs 
e9 256 U. S. ~, 41 Sup. Ct. 6o4 (1921). 
10 In 19 MrcH. L. Rev. 571 is a note on a state decision holding that an 
island may not be subjected to a special assessment for a highway on the 
mainland. 
1 1 254 U. S. 228, 41 Sup. Ct. 103 (1921). 
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to be licensed and providing that the fees collected should go to 
the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. 
In essence the complaint of the dog owner must have been that this 
was taxation for a non-public purpose. Mr. Justice McReynolds 
answered: 
"And when the state in the reasonable conduct of its own 
affairs chooses to entrust the work incident to such licenses 
and collection of fees to a corporation created by it for the 
express purpose of aiding in law enforcement, and in good 
faith appropriates the funds so collected for payment of 
expenses fairly incurred and just compensation for the val-
uable services rendered, there is no infringement of any 
right guaranteed to the individual by the federal Constitu-
tion. Such action does not amount to the taking of one 
man's property and giving it to another, nor does it deprive 
dog owners of liberty without due process of law."72 
Several tax cases which are appropriately classified under the 
head of intergovernmental relations may have brief mention here. 
Marshall v. New York73 held that the federal courts should recog-
nize a state's prerogative lien for unpaid ta."'{es and instruct a receiver 
appointed by the federal courts to pay the taxes in preference to 
the claims of general unsecured creditors. The decision is not 
referred to any constitutional issue. It was said to be a question 
of state law alone whether the lien existed, and it was observed 
that "the fact that the right rests on common law independently 
of any statute does not, of course, affect the right of enforcement 
in the federal courts." 
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.74 sustained the exemp-
72 Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499 (1920), 19 MrcH. L. 
REv. 134, holding that various enterprises inaugurated by North Dakota are 
public purposes for which taxes may be levied, is discussed in 8 CAI.IF. L. 
REv. 425, 34 HARV. L. lliv. 207, 212, 7 VA. L. REv. 306, and 30 YAI.:E L. J. 429. 
For other questions of public purpose in taxation, see 9 CAI.IF. L. REv. 
431 on free text-books; 19 MICH. L. REv. 747 on a state cement plant; and 6 
CORN.£!.!, L. Q. 448 and I WIS. L. ruv. 125 on a state bonus to world war 
veterans. 
In 19 MICH. L. lliv. 871 is a note on a decision holding invalid, because 
confiscatory, a tax of $300 a month on scalping theatre tickets. 
1a 254 U. S. 380, 41 Sup. Ct. 143 ( 1920). 
74255 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 243 (1921). 
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tion from state taxation accorded to the securities of the federal 
joint-stock land banks and federal land banks by the Act of Con-
gress creating the banks, and declared that any power to tax the 
banks is dependent upon congressional permission. 
Merchants' National Bank of Richmond v. Richmond10 found that 
Virginia had taxed the stock of national banks at a higher rate than 
money loaned at interest, and held that this was a violation of the 
restriction accompanying the congressional permission to tax the 
stock-i. e., that the tax "shall not be at a greater rate than is 
assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual cit-
izens of the state." 
Colttmbia University. THOMAS REED PowEu .. 
(To be continued) 
75 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 619 (1921). 
